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This paper1 reflects upon the interplay between international human rights law and criminal 
law – both national and international – through the international legal regimes that have 
evolved for combating gender-based violence against women, in peacetime and in conflict, 
and human trafficking, especially of women and girls. The different trajectories of these two 
legal regimes are newly associated through the UN Security Council’s recognition that sexual 
violence against women as a tactic of war and human trafficking in conflict constitute threats 
to international peace and security and accordingly come within the Council’s responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The interplay between different international 
legal regimes has generated considerable 
debate since the International Court of Justice 
identified the concept of a “self-contained” 
regime.2 One aspect was the concern in the 
late 1990s and the early years of this century 
about what was called the fragmentation of 
international law, an apprehension that the 
proliferation of specialised regimes would 
undermine the coherence of the discipline.3 
Prominent among such specialised regimes 
were precisely human rights law and 
international criminal law. But there was 
much less concern expressed about the fluidity 
of, the institutional and substantive overlap 
between, and the dissolution of conceptual 
boundaries separating, such legal regimes. 
Further, their very nature entails a blurring 
of the boundaries between national and 
international law. Accordingly, the paper 
considers the convergence of legal regimes 
and the ensuing erosion of clear delineation 
between them. Another – and related – aspect 
is to ask what is meant by a human rights treaty, 
or more broadly what makes a human rights 
agenda? These last questions were originally 
sparked by my involvement as scientific advisor 
to the Council of Europe drafting committee 
for what might well be called Europe’s most 
recent human rights treaty: the Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence.4 But the 
Convention was from the outset conceived 
of as simultaneously a criminal law treaty 
and a human rights treaty, and many state 
delegates to the negotiations were from either 
the Department of Justice or the Department 
of Gender Equality/Human Rights. Throughout 
the negotiations, it became apparent that they 
did not always speak the same language, or 
share assumptions about the very nature of the 
proposed treaty, demonstrating a disciplinary 
divide that is replicated at the international 
institutional level. 
The further spark to my thinking about these 
issues is my current position as Director of a 
Centre for Women Peace and Security (WPS). 
WPS is a Security Council agenda that is 
generally dated from the Council’s adoption 
of Resolution 1325 in 2000. In the words of 
that Resolution, it is an agenda committed to 
recognising “the important role of women 
in the prevention and resolution of conflicts 
and in peace-building”,5 to bringing a gender 
perspective to peacekeeping operations and 
to “an understanding [that] the impact of 
armed conflict on women and girls, effective 
institutional arrangements to guarantee their 
protection and full participation in the peace 
process can significantly contribute to the 
maintenance and promotion of international 
peace and security.”6 Its civil society proponents 
– mainly women activists – sought inclusion 
of the experiences of women in war in the 
security space and celebrated the adoption 
of Resolution 1325 as setting a new standard 
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for the Security Council, UN member states 
and the UN system as a whole. However, as 
Dianne Otto has commented, it was perhaps 
not then appreciated that there might be a 
price to pay,7 that although Resolution 1325 
was in the words of a 2015 Global Study 
on its implementation, “conceived of and 
lobbied for as a human rights resolution that 
would promote the rights of women in conflict 
situations”8 its location in the Security Council 
also made it a security issue. The tension 
between these two positions is something 
I will return to. 
I begin with a brief survey of the interplay 
between human rights law and criminal law 
– with also an appearance by international 
humanitarian law (IHL) – in the evolution 
of international legal regulation of human 
trafficking, especially of women and girls, 
and of violence against women and girls. 
These, for a long time, followed separate 
tracks, although they are linked, not least by 
the factors that contribute to both: poverty, 
sex and gender-based discrimination, 
inequalities, unequal access to economic 
and social rights including education, 
employment and health care. Fleeing from 
gender-based violence makes women 
vulnerable to trafficking, while trafficking in 
women is one manifestation of gender-based 
violence.9 Both are incidents of patriarchy 
and of historically unequal power relations 
between men and women, and are “crucial 
social mechanisms by which women are 
forced into a subordinate position compared 
with men”.10 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
AND VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN AND GIRLS: 
CRIMINAL LAW OR 
HUMAN RIGHTS?
 
Human trafficking has a deep and complex 
legal history. It came earlier onto the 
international agenda than violence against 
women, indeed well before even the 
creation of the League of Nations, through 
a number of treaties campaigned for by a 
mix of early women’s movements and moral 
activists concerned to uphold the “virtue of 
white women”.11 These early treaties were 
not in contemporary terms either human 
rights or criminal law treaties. They focused 
on exploitative prostitution and exclusively 
on cross-border prostitution. In the words 
of one commentator on the four anti-
trafficking treaties in the pre-UN era: “the 
export of immorality across borders had to 
be stopped.”12 The major themes of these 
early treaties have been summarised (and 
simplified) as protection of victims and their 
welfare through education and training, 
exchange of information and criminalisation 
of procurement of women for prostitution 
abroad, while, as Anne Gallagher describes 
it, carefully preserving state authority to 
regulate prostitution internally. There was 
a precursor to the human rights reporting 
process in that the 1921 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Women and Children provided 
for annual reporting and for an Advisory 
Committee of the League on the Traffic of 
Women and Children. 
These various treaties were consolidated 
in 1949 into the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others.13 The Convention has a criminal 
law focus, requiring punishment of those 
involved in procurement, exploitation of 
prostitution, running or managing a brothel, 
providing for extradition for such offences, 
and checking “the traffic in persons of either 
sex for the purpose of prostitution.” There is 
a welfare angle in response to the fact that 
prostitution and trafficking for that purpose 
“endanger the welfare of the individual, 
the family and the community”14 and some 
human rights language in that prostitution – 
whether within a state’s borders or involving 
cross-border activity – and trafficking for 
the purpose of prostitution are called 
“incompatible with the dignity and worth 
of the human person”.15 The former – 
prostitution – is subject to international 
regulation although it falls squarely within 
the internal affairs of the state. But the 
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human rights commitment is limited. In 
the words of the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, the 1949 Convention 
has “proved ineffective in protecting the 
rights of trafficked women and combating 
trafficking. [It] does not take a human rights 
approach. It does not regard women as 
independent actors endowed with rights 
and reason; rather, the Convention views 
them as vulnerable beings in need of 
protection from the ‘evils of prostitution’.”16 
Human trafficking is implicitly prohibited by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the human rights Covenants through 
such articles as those on the prohibition of 
slavery and servitude, free and full consent 
to marriage and the right to free choice of 
employment.17 Human trafficking enters 
directly and explicitly (but without definition) 
into a human rights treaty through the 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
30 years after the 1949 Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others. CEDAW, article 6 states that: “States 
Parties shall take all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to suppress all forms 
of traffic in women and exploitation of 
prostitution of women”. Importantly this 
encompasses “all forms of trafficking” not 
just that for the purposes of prostitution, 
although exploitation of prostitution 
remains. But this is strange language for 
a human rights treaty; it is not an equality 
provision like every other substantive 
article of CEDAW, nor is it an assertion 
of women’s rights, nor a straight-forward 
requirement of criminal law. Interestingly 
the CEDAW Committee has not adopted a 
General Recommendation on the subject, 
nor considered an individual communication 
on trafficking through to the merits.18 In 
human rights terms, CEDAW is followed by 
article 35 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, which provides that states must 
“take all appropriate … measures to prevent 
the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in 
children for any purpose or in any form”. 
In the 1990s, the trafficking narrative begins 
to merge with that of the international 
legal story relating to combating violence 
against women and girls. Like trafficking, 
violence against women was not at first 
seen as self-evidently a human rights issue. 
As is well known, CEDAW has no provision 
directly relating to violence against women: 
its equality framework necessitating a male 
comparator excluded from its ambit violence 
that occurs to women because they are 
women. It entered the international arena 
as a social matter of crime prevention and 
criminal justice, as for instance in the General 
Assembly’s first resolution on domestic 
violence in 1985. That resolution recognised 
that “abuse and battery in the family are 
critical problems that have serious physical 
and psychological effects on individual 
family members” and that they need to 
be examined through the lenses of “crime 
prevention and criminal justice in the context 
of socio-economic circumstances.”19 The 
UN Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control had also identified violence against 
family members as an important issue for 
it to address. Violence against women 
was primarily perceived of as the deviant 
behaviour of an individual rather than as a 
public matter sustained and acquiesced in 
by the organisational structures of society. 
Other lenses through which violence against 
women was viewed were those of health, 
social welfare or harmful traditional practices 
such as female genital mutilation, thus de-
linking it from the structural inequalities 
inherent in existing gender relations. A 
collective shift in mind-set was needed to 
bring violence against women within the 
framework of international human rights 
law incurring state obligations and state 
responsibility for failure to respect, protect 
and fulfil those obligations. The key moment 
for that shift was the 1992 adoption by the 
CEDAW Committee of its ground breaking 
General Recommendation No. 19 that 
asserted violence against women to be 
an act of discrimination within the terms 
of article 1 of the Convention and hence 
a violation of the Convention. However 
General Recommendation No. 19 added 
little to article 6 of CEDAW apart from noting 
that poverty and unemployment increase 
opportunities for trafficking in women, and 
that there are diverse and new forms of 
sexual exploitation in addition to what it 
termed “established forms of trafficking”, 
such as sex tourism, domestic labour and 
organised marriages of women from 
developing countries to foreign nationals. 
The World Conference on Human Rights 
took place in Vienna the following year 
– 1993. It has been widely claimed that 
women were the biggest winners at Vienna. 
Through the efforts of women activists, 
supported by academic commentary, and 
with the support of like-minded states, the 
Conference upheld gender-based violence 
as “incompatible with the dignity and 
worth of the human person” and stressed 
“the importance of working towards [its] 
elimination … in public and private life” as 
well as the elimination of “exploitation and 
trafficking in women”. 20 Another linkage 
was now coming to the fore, that with armed 
conflict. These normative developments 
were taking place against the backdrop of 
4the media coverage of the widespread sexual 
violence that was committed in the wars 
associated with the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia, in particular Bosnia. In General 
Recommendation No. 19 the CEDAW 
Committee had referenced the impact of 
armed conflict on prostitution, trafficking 
in women and sexual assault of women 
and the need for “specific protective and 
punitive measures.” Vienna is stronger with 
its assertion that “[v]iolations of the human 
rights of women in situations of armed 
conflict are violations of the fundamental 
principles of international human rights 
and humanitarian law. All violations of 
this kind, including in particular murder, 
systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced 
pregnancy, require a particularly effective 
response.”21 Thus at Vienna exploitation and 
trafficking of women were delinked from 
prostitution, which had no mention except 
in the context of child prostitution, and 
were brought squarely into the framework 
of human rights. 
The acceptance of violence against women 
in armed conflict as a violation of human 
rights as well as of IHL disrupts the traditional 
divide between the two legal regimes. It 
supports the notion of a continuum of 
violence against women linking that which 
occurs in ordinary everyday life – peacetime 
– and that taking place in armed conflict, 
thereby reinforcing states’ obligations with 
respect to elimination of violence against 
women in public and private. Wartime 
violence however is elevated; article 5 of 
the Statute for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, adopted 
by the UN Security Council the same year, 
included for the first time rape as a crime 
against humanity within the jurisdiction 
of an international criminal court. The 
concept of a crime against humanity was 
not decoupled from conflict until the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
another 5 years later. 
Having come together at Vienna and again 
in 1995 at the Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing, when trafficking 
in women and girls was recognised as a 
form of sex and gender-based violence 
against women,22 the trafficking story 
and the violence against women story to 
some extent again separate. Regulation of 
trafficking was furthered by the UN Crime 
Commission, rather than by the Human 
Rights Commission, with the drafting of the 
2000 Palermo Protocol to the Convention 
on Transnational Organised Crime to 
“prevent and combat trafficking in persons, 
paying particular attention to women and 
children”.23 There is some acknowledgment 
of human rights as the one of the purposes 
of the Protocol is “to protect and assist the 
victims of such trafficking, with full respect 
for their human rights”. Nevertheless the 
crime control emphasis (furthered by the first 
international definition of the trafficking) 
caused concerns that this would diminish 
the attention and commitment due to the 
human rights of victims. In a deliberate 
attempt to avoid this and to keep human 
rights in the foreground of the picture, 
the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) produced its 
Recommended Principles and Guidelines 
on Human Rights and Human Trafficking 
that were presented to the Economic and 
Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) as 
an addendum to a report from the High 
Commissioner. The Guidelines put the 
human rights of trafficked persons “at the 
centre of all efforts to prevent and combat 
trafficking and to protect, assist and provide 
21 Ibid.
22 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 
September 1995, paras 99 and 113.
23 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 55/25, 15 November 2000.
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Acceptance of violence against women in armed 
conflict as a violation of human rights as well as of 
IHL disrupts the traditional divide between the two 
legal regimes. It supports the notion of a continuum 
of violence against women linking that which occurs 
in ordinary everyday life – peacetime – and that taking 
place in armed conflict, thereby reinforcing states’ 
obligations with respect to elimination of violence 
against women in public and private. 
ISTANBUL CONVENTION: 
CRIMINAL LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS
Turning back to combating violence 
against women, normative development 
has progressed at the UN level, notably 
through the jurisprudence of the CEDAW 
Committee under the CEDAW Optional 
Protocol, and the recent update of its 1992 
General Recommendation No. 19, General 
Recommendation No. 35 adopted on 26 July 
2017, and through the work of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, a 
mandate approved in 1993 following the 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. 
At the regional level, the 2011 Council 
of Europe Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and 
domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) 
is widely regarded as “state of the art”. 
It draws upon the language and practice 
of these international bodies as well as 
the emergent jurisprudence on violence 
against women of the European Court 
of Human Rights.28 However, unlike the 
Palermo Protocol, the Istanbul Convention 
was drafted deliberately as a human rights 
treaty as well as a criminal law treaty. This 
designation required consideration of 
what should be in a human rights treaty, 
as opposed to concentrating solely on the 
human rights of survivors. In its human 
rights capacity, it asserts that “‘violence 
against women’ is understood as a 
violation of human rights and a form of 
discrimination against women” (Istanbul 
Convention, article 3 (a)). It emphasises 
substantive equality between women and 
men as an immediate state obligation 
and condemns all forms of discrimination 
against women, thereby setting out the 
legal link between gender equality and 
preventing violence against women and 
girls. Further, in article 4 it provides that 
it must be applied to all victims without 
discrimination on a wide range of grounds, 
including disability, health and – for the 
first time in an international treaty – on 
the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
redress to victims” but this still falls short 
of an outright assertion that trafficking 
per se constitutes a violation of women’s 
human rights, a stance that is found in the 
2005 Council of Europe Convention on 
Trafficking: “trafficking in human beings 
constitutes a violation of human rights”,24 
and is echoed by the Special Rapporteur on 
trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children: “Trafficking in persons, especially 
women and children, is a gross human 
rights violation.”25 Such an understanding 
incurs the state obligation “to investigate 
allegations of trafficking and prosecute 
traffickers” under general human rights 
law; within Europe this has been affirmed 
by the European Court of Human Rights 
since the ground-breaking case of Rantsev v 
Russia and Cyprus in 2010.26 Human rights 
institutions have thus been unwilling to 
leave regulation of trafficking solely in the 
domain of criminal law – the mandate 
of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking 
as a special procedure of the UN Human 
Rights Council is a further indication of 
this, as is the inclusion of the issue within 
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women. However state 
action in implementation of the Palermo 
Protocol has veered away from human 
rights. In the words of Ratna Kapur, it has 
“triggered a vast network of laws designed 
to regulate cross-border movement through 
law and order regimes and criminal justice” 
reflecting “an increasing obsession with 
national security, law and order, and border 
protection in the context of globalisation 
and free market ideology” that lead to 
scepticism as to whether it has resolved 
trafficking or served women’s human 
rights.27 One might add that this has also 
entailed a large expenditure, which is way 
above that expended on responding to 
other forms of violence against women.
24 Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Warsaw, 16 May 2005, preamble.
25 Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, A/
HRC/29/38, 31 May 2015, para 7.
26 Application no. 25965/04, 7 January 2010.
27 Ratna Kapur, “Gender, Sovereignty and 
the Rise of a Sexual Security Regime in 
International Law and Postcolonial India”, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 14 
(2) (2013), 317, 334.
28 See Council of Europe, Fact Sheet, Violence 
against Women, June 2017, http://www.echr.
coe.int/Documents/FS_Violence_Woman_
ENG.pdf
29 Istanbul Convention, article 66.1: “The 
Group of Experts on Action against Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘GREVIO’) 
shall monitor the implementation of this 
Convention by the Parties.”
30  Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
article 38.1: “The Group of experts on 
action against trafficking in human beings 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘GRETA’), 
shall monitor the implementation of this 
Convention by the Parties.”
identity. It spells out that no culture, custom, 
religion or tradition can be considered as 
a justification for acts of violence within 
the Convention. Most importantly the 
Convention spells out the essential state 
responsibility for human rights: states’ 
negative obligation to refrain from any act 
of violence by its agents and the positive 
obligation to exercise due diligence to 
prevent and protect against violence against 
women committed by non-state actors, to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators and to 
provide reparations for victims (Istanbul 
Convention, article 5). It also recognises 
women’s agency and the importance of 
measures for the empowerment of women. 
In drafting it was agreed that there should 
be an independent expert mechanism for 
monitoring progress in implementation 
and to develop jurisprudence around its 
provisions, apparently now a hallmark of 
a human rights treaty. The model for an 
expert body to monitor compliance with 
the Istanbul Convention – GREVIO29 – was 
that set up under the Council of Europe 
trafficking treaty – GRETA.30 The Palermo 
Protocol in contrast provides for no such 
6independent mechanism; its parent body, 
the Convention on Transnational Organised 
Crime provides only for a Conference 
of States Parties, a more traditional 
international law (as opposed to human 
rights) monitoring device. 
But Istanbul is also a criminal law treaty. 
Unless it falls within the categories of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, 
gender-based violence against women is 
not per se an international crime. Thus 
the Convention had to identify specific 
actions within the rubric of violence against 
women and provide for their criminalisation 
and prosecution at the domestic level,31 
requiring a specificity of language with 
respect to the substance of criminal law 
and procedure that is in stark contrast to 
the more open ended language of human 
rights treaties. The latter are worded at a 
high level of abstraction with imprecise 
and indeterminate language. They do not 
prescribe states’ behaviour in any consistent 
form, but rather provide for differing levels of 
commitment depending upon the context. 
There are gaps that must be fleshed out. 
The language allows states a considerable 
discretion, or margin of appreciation in how 
they fulfil their obligations. They must retain 
their relevance in changing political, social 
and economic circumstances, even as they 
become ever more dated. In sum a human 
rights treaty must be a “dynamic instrument 
that accommodates the development of 
international law.”32 Criminal law, in contrast, 
requires the certainty that allows people 
to know what behaviour is proscribed and 
precision for application by law enforcement 
bodies and prosecution of alleged offenders. 
Treaty obligations for domestic criminal law 
enforcement means that crimes must be 
listed, defined and their elements spelled 
out. During the negotiations for the Istanbul 
Convention arguments were made that some 
proposed crimes of violence against women 
were better understood as instances of social 
misbehaviour that should not be subject 
to criminal sanction, for instance stalking 
and harassment, or proposed definitions 
were rejected on the grounds that they were 
too indeterminate to be brought before a 
criminal court. And while human rights 
assumes universal application criminal law 
provisions had to be adaptable to both civil 
law and common law systems of criminal law 
and procedure. Criminal prosecution requires 
a court with prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction that must be in accordance with 
international law principles of jurisdiction. 
Crimes of violence against women within 
the terms of the Istanbul Convention are 
made subject to territorial jurisdiction and 
to jurisdiction based on the nationality or 
habitual residence of the alleged offender in 
a state party; unlike the Council of Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings there is no provision for 
jurisdiction where the offence is committed 
against a national, so–called passive 
personality. There is provision for jurisdiction 
to be established over an alleged offender 
who is present in the country where that 
person is not extradited to another party 
“solely on the basis of her or his nationality.” 
(Istanbul Convention, article 44). However 
there are no detailed provisions with respect 
to extradition as in the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime. 
The Istanbul Convention does not purport 
to address violence against women in armed 
conflict, and is regarded as complementary 
to the principles of IHL and international 
criminal law.33 Nevertheless, since the forms 
of violence it covers do not cease during 
armed conflict or occupation, it is spelled 
out that the Convention is applicable in 
situations of armed conflict as well as in 
times of peace (article 2.3). The international 
human rights institutions, however, including 
the UN Human Rights Council and the treaty 
bodies, have brought IHL directly within their 
scope, for instance in mandating fact-finding 
missions. As an example, I was a member of 
a fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict of 
2008-9 that was mandated “to investigate 
all violations of international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law that 
might have been committed at any time in 
the context of the military operations”.34 
While perhaps substituting for the continued 
31 The adoption of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings in 2005 meant that 
trafficking was not included among the 
listed crimes of violence against women in 
the Istanbul Convention.
32 Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 28, on the core 
obligations of States parties under article 
2 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, para 1.
33 Council of Europe, Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence, Explanatory 
Report 51.
non-use of the International Fact-Finding 
Commission provided for under Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions, it might be 
questioned where the UN Human Rights 
Council acquires the competence to bring 
IHL into its terms of reference. By doing so, 
it risks blurring the conceptual and practical 
distinctions between the two legal regimes, 
not to mention the potential for human rights 
lawyers to get IHL wrong. Any conclusions 
about the commission of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity also necessarily raise issues 
of international criminal law. This conjunction 
of legal regimes is implicitly welcomed by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) Special 
Rapporteur on crimes against humanity. In 
his third report, Sean Murphy observes that:
“Human rights treaty bodies will often 
identify situations of crimes against humanity 
and provide recommendations for response, 
when the crimes against humanity intersect 
with the subject matter of the treaty. For 
example, when receiving reports from 
States parties, the Human Rights Committee 
addresses violations of the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights such 
as violations of the right to life or the right 
not to be subjected to torture, which include 
circumstances where those violations rise to 
the level of crimes against humanity. Thus, 
while the mandates of the Human Rights 
Committee and other subsidiary bodies do 
not specifically include monitoring crimes 
against humanity, these bodies can identify 
and recommend appropriate State responses 
to crimes against humanity.”35 
Of course, crimes against humanity have now 
been decoupled from armed conflict and 
are not technically part of IHL, but in many 
instances the “circumstances where those 
violations rise to the level of crimes against 
humanity” will be association with conflict, 
and the ILC Special Rapporteur certainly 
accepts the preliminary work of the human 
rights bodies in identifying the commission 
of international crimes.
VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN, TRAFFICKING 
AND WPS
In 2000 – the same year as the adoption 
of the Palermo Protocol – a new actor 
entered the scene with respect to violence 
against women in armed conflict: the UN 
Security Council, through its introduction 
of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 
agenda. The first operative paragraph, and 
thus emphasis, of its Resolution 1325 is on 
women’s participation in all stages of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution, 
on gender mainstreaming and “to protect 
women and girls from gender-based 
violence, particularly rape and other forms of 
sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence 
in situations of armed conflict”. This is a 
wide formulation of violence against women 
and girls. Resolution 1325 also reminds 
states of their existing obligations under 
IHL, CEDAW, the Children’s Convention, 
and to bear in mind the Rome Statute. But 
eight years later, the next Resolution, 1820, 
is more restrictive. Its preamble refers to the 
resolve “to eliminate all forms of violence 
against women and girls”, but the operative 
part of the resolution refers only to sexual, 
not “all forms” or even “gender-based”, 
violence so that “sexual violence, when 
used or commissioned as a tactic of war 
in order to deliberately target civilians or 
as a part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against civilian populations, can 
significantly exacerbate situations of armed 
conflict and may impede the restoration 
of international peace and security”. It 
goes on to affirm that “effective steps to 
prevent and respond to such acts of sexual 
violence [ie, those committed as a tactic 
of war] can significantly contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security”. While important in its rejection 
of sexual violence in conflict as an inevitable 
by-product of war and as recognition of 
what it often is – a cheap and effective 
tactic of war that can constitute a war 
crime, crime against humanity and even 
genocide – this formula is limiting. The 
34 United Nations Human Rights Council, 
Resolution S-9/1, A/HRC/S-9/L.1, 12 January 
2009.
35 Sean D. Murphy, Third report on crimes 
against humanity, United Nations 
International Law Commission, A/CN.4/704, 
23 January 2017, para 220.
36 Cynthia Cockburn, “The Continuum of 
Violence: A Gender Perspective on War 
and Peace”, in Sites of Violence: Gender 
and Conflict Zones, ed. Wenona Giles and 
Jennifer Hyndman (University of California 
Press, 2004).
37 Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 30, on women in 
conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict 
situations, CEDAW/C/GC/30, 1 November 
2013.
38 On gender stereotypes see Rebecca Cook 
and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: 
Transnational Legal Perspectives (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
repeated focus only on sexual violence 
against women downplays other abuses, 
including sexual violence against men and 
boys, and other forms of gender-based 
violence against women and girls. It also 
discounts the incidence of wartime sexual 
violence that is not a tactic of war such as 
opportunistic violence or that committed by 
civilians, thereby minimising the likelihood 
of their being addressed in post-conflict 
reconstruction. It also portrays gender-
based and sexual violence in conflict as 
exceptional rather than as rooted in gender 
inequality and as occurring in a continuum 
from that committed outside conflict in 
so-called “peacetime”.36 It assumes that 
conflict is different in kind from other 
situations of violence such as “ethnic and 
communal violence, states of emergency 
and suppression of mass uprisings, war 
against terrorism and organized crime”, yet 
we know that all these situations result in 
serious violations of women’s rights.37 Such 
violence casts women solely in terms of their 
sexual identities and sustains the essentialist 
image of women as victims, upholding the 
binary of women in need of protection 
from the “evil” of sexual violence and men 
(especially international and militarised men) 
as their designated protectors, thereby 
sustaining rather than challenging gender 
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Resources made available for fighting 
violence in the form of extremism does not 
extend to these victims of violence who face 
the consequences of financial austerity and 
often inadequate access to justice. The effect 
is to reinforce violence in conflict, especially 
when perpetrated by terrorist or extremist 
groups, as different, necessitating the heavy 
weight security apparatus to address it. By 
presenting manifestations of violence in 
armed conflict narrowly as security issues, 
the Security Council restricts any broader 
understanding relating to human rights, 
in particular economic and social rights, 
although these are deeply implicated in both 
gender-based violence against women and 
trafficking. Nor in the context of WPS has 
the Security Council given commensurate 
attention to structural issues such as state 
terror, inequalities, militarisation, economic 
neo-liberalism or arms trading,49 which are 
understood by civil society as obstacles 
to effectively combating violence against 
women and human trafficking. 
Building upon the earlier campaign for 
recognition of gender-based violence against 
women as a violation of human rights, it was 
clear to the civil society advocates in 2000 
and to the authors of the Global Study in 
2015 that WPS is such an agenda. Similarly, 
human rights institutions have lobbied for 
an understanding of human trafficking 
within a human rights framework that 
goes beyond taking into account the human 
rights of victims in criminal processes with 
respect to perpetrators and even beyond 
ensuring assistance to trafficked persons. 
By integrating these into the Security 
Council’s primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security – thereby securitising human rights 
– the weakening of the human rights lens 
was probably inevitable, with the further 
risks of subjugation and co-option by the 
programmes for P/CVE. But the ultimate 
goal of combating violence against women 
and human trafficking in conflict – the 
vision of a sustainable, gendered peace 
– must not be forgotten, nor that the 
feminist transformative agenda is core to 
its achievement. 
+ 
Despite being a form of violence in conflict and a 
human rights abuse, trafficking has not figured in the 
eight WPS resolutions and despite recognising that 
trafficking in persons in conflict and post-conflict 
can be associated with sexual violence in conflict, the 
Security Council did not link its trafficking resolution 
to the WPS agenda.
